Morris R. Cohen: A Philosopher\u27s Influence on the Law by Harry N. Rosenfield
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 26 
Number 1 Volume 26, Winter 1980, Number 1 Article 4 
September 2017 
Morris R. Cohen: A Philosopher's Influence on the Law 
Harry N. Rosenfield 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry N. Rosenfield (1980) "Morris R. Cohen: A Philosopher's Influence on the Law," The Catholic Lawyer: 
Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol26/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
MORRIS R. COHEN: A
PHILOSOPHER'S
INFLUENCE ON THE
LAW
HARRY N. ROSENFIELD*
Morris Raphael Cohen, the American philosopher, has had a major-
impact on the development of both legal philosophy and the law itself in
the United States. This article addresses only a few aspects of Cohen's
enormous influence.1 Since his lifetime (1880-1947), the changes which
may be attributed to him have been taken for granted by lawyers, judges,
authors, and historians. Cohen frequently has been afforded less credit
than is due him, perhaps because he was interested more in propagating
ideas than in claiming credit for them, and because he founded no
"school," sought neither to encourage disciples nor converts," nor to in-
doctrinate his students.3
Four facets of Cohen's seminal influence on the law will be discussed:
(1) Philosophy of law-what and why; (2) the revival of legal philosophy
in the United States; (3) debunking the fiction that judges declare, but do
* LL.B., Columbia University School of Law; J.D., New York University School of Law;
B.A., City College of New York.
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ICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH, ch. 6 (F. Cohen ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN
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OF A LIBERAL]; M. R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1933) [hereinafter cited as LAW
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not make, the law; and (4) substantive legal themes.
I. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-L-WHAT AND WHY
A. What is Philosophy of Law?
In a 1912 paper entitled "Jurisprudence as a Philosophic Discipline,"
Cohen indicated the purpose of a philosophy of law:
[T]o examine anew the problem of social ends in relation to law and morals
and the life of civilization .... The vitality of philosophy cannot continue
if it adheres to the ideal of a monastic or sterile celibacy.'
Cohen viewed legal philosophy as an integral part of any social-ethi-
cal system.' In "My Philosophy of Law," published in 1940, he said that
"when we ask ... how are we to choose the basic premises of our legal
system, we enter the realm of ethics as the science of ultimate human
ends."' Cohen saw that law, as a part of the entire social process, could
ignore neither philosophy, history, nor social science.7 While law is "a
part of an enforceable social morality," it is not identical with morality.9
In his 1929 Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the
American Philosophical Association, "Vision and Technique in Philoso-
phy," he described the function of philosophical vision or contemplation
as designed "[tlo introduce order and consistency into our vision, to re-
move pleasant but illusory plausibilities, to contrast various views with
their possible alternatives, and to judge critically all pretended proofs in
the light of rigorous rules of scientific evidence ....",0
Cohen frequently referred to the profound insight" of Mr. Justice
Holmes' observation that "[tlo have doubted one's own first principles is
the mark of a civilized man."'" In this light, Cohen was seen as "a dispas-
sionate critic of established beliefs and institutions who sifts the grain
from the chaff."'
In an unpublished and undated fragment of his writings, Cohen aptly
described the philosophy of law:
The philosophy of law means an effort to carry legal theory far enough to
make it conscious of its fundamental assumptions as to the ultimate nature
MY PHILOSOiHY, supra note 1, at 135-36.
1 Id. at 129.
6 Id. at 6.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 118.
10 FAITH OF A LIBERAL, supra note 1, at 380; 39 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 127 (1930).
See, e.g., M. R. COHEN, THE MEANING OF HUMAN HISTORY 175 (1947).
0. W. HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 307 (1920).
13 Nagel, Morris R. Cohen in Retrospect, 18 J. HIsT. IDEAS 550 (1957).
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of its subject matter, its method of reasoning, its ideals, etc. Concretely, it
means, first, a critical analysis of the methods of reasoning. Second, an ex-
amination of the fundamental ethical or moral assumptions, an attempt to
systematize the ultimate values of the law or at least to determine the basis
or criterion of judging what is good or better among the various considera-
tions and phases of human life that enter into determination of legal issues.
Third, an examination of human nature in its individual and group manifes-
tations. To what extent do rational emotional and volutional [sic] elements
enter into and influence our legal system? And finally, the metaphysical is-
sue of nominalism and realism, whether the ideal, the norm, or the realm of
validity involves a monistic or dualistic view of existence. What is the char-
acter of the formal and material elements which enter into the law?"
B. Why is Philosophy of Law Relevant to Law?
Cohen regarded the philosophy of law as important not only for phi-
losophers, but also for lawyers. Recognizing the inability of philosophy to
solve the specific problems of society, he emphasized that an understand-
ing of what is essential to civilization would foster the resolution of those
problems. 5 According to his biographer, Cohen stressed the importance
of subjecting unacknowledged assumptions and ethical judgments to a ra-
tional analysis. ' 6
. Benjamin N. Cardozo, as New York State's Chief Judge, lauded Co-
hen's efforts to dispel the notion that law should be so segmented from
philosophy:
I can think of no one who has battled against that view more steadily and
gallantly than this pseudo-lawyer who has enriched our conception of our
jurisprudence by the fertilizing waters of a profound and pure philosophy..
. We shall never separate the law from the study of philosophy unless we
are ready to condemn it to barrenness and decay.' 7
Viewing the philosophy of law as a pragmatic necessity for helping
"to harmonize conflicting rules and to decide which of competing tenden-
cies or analogies in the law is to be favored in new cases,'" Cohen also
believed that jurisprudence made law "a more effective tool in the cause
of social justice."1' It is necessary to turn to his concept of the role of
philosophy in general in order to understand how he believed philosophy
14 This unpublished fragment, and others referred to hereafter, are from Morris R. Cohen's
unpublished papers.
" MY PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 104; Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal Thought, 84 U.
PA. L. REv. 715 (1936).
L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 192.
S. Hook, supra note 2, at 39-40.
18 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 351.
" Cohen, Foreward to The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIsT. IDEAS 5 (1948); see
L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 16.
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and law interrelated: "Instead of life, we want the good life .... Rational
philosophy tries to meet this need by defining the good, the true, and the
beautiful."20 Law is a means of reaching this goal, since "the conscien-
tious judge must ask which of the various decisions that he can see best
suits the interests of the community he serves."'"
II. THE REVIVAL OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1912, Cohen introduced and taught the first course given in legal
philosophy at the City College of New York.22 In that year, he presented
a paper on "Jurisprudence as a Philosophic Discipline," which shocked
his fellow-philosophers in much the same way as "The Process of Judicial
Legislation," published in 1913, would shock the Bar. The paper la-
mented that legal philosophy in the United States had been neglected in
recent years.2  He called on the American Philosophical Association to
cooperate with the plan of the American Association of Law Schools to
translate a series of European works on legal philosophy. 4 In 1913, Cohen
was the chief initiator of the organization of the Conference on Legal and
Social Philosophy; he served as Secretary, and John Dewey served as
Chairman. Morris's son, Felix S. Cohen, has noted that "much of the so-
cial and philosophic consciousness of modern American jurisprudence de-
rives" from this Conference. 25 Its purpose was to make professors of law
more cognizant of the assumptions on which their teaching was
predicated.26
In the succeeding years, Cohen spread legal philosophy into the na-
tion's philosophy and law curricula by serving as co-editor of The Modern
Legal Philosophy Series, by writing on legal philosophy in philosophical
journals and law reviews, and by teaching and lecturing at numerous law
schools.27
Lawyers, in particular, have been most generous in acknowledging
Cohen's role in connection with American legal philosophy. Professor
Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School, described Cohen as "the
M. R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 457 (1st ed. 1931) [hereinafter cited as REASON AND
NATURE].
" LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 246.
" For this course, M. R. Cohen developed Readings in the Philosophy of Law (privately
published), which was subsequently enlarged into READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (F. S. Cohen & M. R. Cohen eds. 1951).
" MY PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 129.
" At an early date, M. R. Cohen became a co-editor of this series.
"5 Cohen, Foreward to AMERICAN THOUGHT, supra note 1, at 14. For a discussion of the
history of the Conference, see M. R. COHEN, A DREAMER'S JOURNEY 178-88 (1949) [hereinaf-
ter cited as DREAMER'S JOURNEY].
26 Id.
11 L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 189-90.
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pioneer in the revival of philosophy of law in America .... ,,28 Not sur-
prisingly, a mutual intellectual attraction, which was to last over 20 years,
developed between philosopher Cohen and Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes.2 9 One explanation for this relationship, it has been sug-
gested, is that Cohen was "the first American philosopher to interest him-
self in the law, as Holmes was the first American lawyer to interest him-
self in philosophy."30
The philosopher waged a dual battle-one against the current dogma
of the philosophers who wanted no taint of jurisprudence, the other
against the lawyers who saw no relevance in philosophy. From the van-
tage-point of his autobiography, Cohen wrote that his 1912 paper "left
the waters of academic philosophy unrippled."' The effect on the Bar,
however, may have been more significant: "More and more, following the
good example of Holmes, our foremost judges have come to see that their
daily work involves fundamental ethical, logical, and other philosophical
issues .... ",'
Cohen's revolutionary suggestion is now so commonplace in both phi-
losophy and law that one sometimes forgets the prophetic courage it took
to fly in the face of the orthodoxies of the time. Today, in large part due
to Morris R. Cohen, philosophy of law is a recognized and integral aspect
of both philosophical and legal disciplines in the United States.
III. DEBUNKING THE FICTION THAT JUDGES DECLARE,
BUT DO NOT MAKE, THE LAW
The American Bar Association's annual report of 1907 warned the
legal profession to beware of judicial legislation."3 In 1913, Cohen shocked
the legal world with his landmark paper entitled "The Process of Judicial
Legislation,"" in which he attacked the ABA's position as patently incor-
rect."5 Deriding that view as "the phonograph theory of the judicial func-
tion-according to which the judge merely repeats the words that the law
has spoken into him ... ,,R he struck at the very heart of the then cur-
" Id. at 197.
" See id. at ch. 16; The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 19.
'0 Judge Nathan R. Margold, quoted in L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 186.
11 DREAMER'S JOURNEY, supra note 26, at 177.
82 READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY at v (F. S. Cohen & M. R. Cohen eds.
1951).
11 See Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 REP. A.B.A. 44-52 (1907).
3' Margold, Morris R. Cohen as a Teacher of Lawyers and Jurists, in FREEDOM AND REASON
43 (1946), quoted in Cohen, Foreward to AMERICAN THOUGHT, supra note 1, at 13.
11 See LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 112. This paper was read at the first
Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy, held April 26, 1913, and published in 48 Am. L.
REv. 161 (1914). LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 112 n.1.
" Id. at 112.
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rent legal and judicial orthodoxy: "[t]he process of judicial legislation is
.. .determined consciously or unconsciously by the judge's view of fair
play, public policy, and the general nature of things. 3 7
Cohen applied the doctrine of judicial legislation to the development
of the common law"' as well as to administrative decisions and judicial
interpretation of statutes.8 9 The traditionally conservative legal establish-
ment was most appalled, however, when Cohen applied this concept to
constitutional law:
As a historic fact it cannot be denied that the vast body of constitutional
law has been made by our courts in accordance with their sense of justice or
public policy. The whole theory of police power is a judicial invention. The
term does not occur in our constitution .... 40
Cohen argued that in each context, principles of judicial legislation were
intertwined with philosophy.4'1 He continued to emphasize this point for
the rest of his life. 42 In 1936, reacting to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "court-packing plan" to increase the size of the Supreme
Court in order to defeat constitutional attacks on New Deal legislation, 3
Cohen said:
If then, our constitutional law does change from time to time or adapts it-
self to new conditions, it must be that the process of interpreting the Con-
stitution is really a form of legislation or constitution-making .... [Tihe
most important issues that come befor6 the [Supreme] court are not ques-
tions of well-settled law but concern issues of public policy about which
well-informed and well-disposed people differ .... 44
Perhaps Cohen's most devastating attack on the "phonograph the-
ory" appeared in a private letter he wrote in July 1935 to his old Harvard
roommate, Felix Frankfurter: "Constitutional law is politics, and not very
clean politics at that-for it deals in dishonest intellectual coinage hiding
factual issues under false legal covers. '4
Why was it so important to recognize that judges made, and did not
merely declare, the law? Cohen explained that the phonograph theory di-
31 Id. at 123.
" Id. at 112.
n Id. at 133-34.
40 Id. at 138.
41 Id. at 144.
4' See, e.g., FArrH OF A LmERAL, supra note 1, at 44; MY PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at vi-vii,
8 passim.
43 See C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
41 FAITH OP A LIBERAL, supra note 1, at 176 & 180. In the same year he wrote: The pretense
that every decision of the Supreme Court follows logically from the Constitution must,
therefore, be characterized as a superstition. MY PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 74.
41 L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 264.
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vorced the development of the law from the social, political, and eco-
nomic sciences. A recognition of judicial legislation will underscore the
need for science to supply the best available information, he continued."
Moreover, since decisions which interpret the Constitution are statements
of policy, all facts relevant to the controversy should be evaluated.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, charges of "judicial legis-
lation" were regarded as intellectual treason within the legal community.
The American Bar Association and its stalwarts had set the "proper"
tone and doctrine: Courts find, not make, the law. In his autobiography,
Morris Cohen wryly commented: "[B]ack in 1912 these ideas were far
from the beaten track of philosophers, lawyers, judges and even law
teachers. ' 7 He also noted that the paper on judicial legislation
created more of a stir than anything I had ever written. Much of the stir
was quite unfavorable . . . . The deans of some of our largest law schools
wrote me that while the contention that judges do have a share in making
the law was unanswerable, it was still advisable to keep up the fiction of the
phonograph theory to prevent the law from becoming more fluid than it
already is .... ,1
Today, the existence of "judicial legislation" is rarely disputed. The com-
mon law is avowedly judge-made."9
Even in constitutional law, it is now widely recognized that judicial
interpretation is judicial legislation or constitution making or remaking.
For example, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka,50 which established the doctrine that separate
educational facilities for black people are not equal, marked a complete
about-face from its position in the decision it overruled, Plessy v. Fergu-
son. 1 This reversal can only be explained by a recognition of judicial leg-
islation. Significantly, the Supreme Court justified its constitutional rein-
terpretation by the open use of psychological and sociological data. 2
Did the Constitution change-or only the judges' interpreta-
tion-when the Supreme Court nullified the death penalty in 1972 by re-
interpreting a 200-year-old doctrine of American legal history? How else,
except by recognizing the fact of judicial legislation, can one explain the
Supreme Court's ruling that capital punishment-admittedly "employed
46 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 380-81 & n.86; Legal Theories and Social
Science, 25 Ir'L J. ETHIcs 469 (1915).
47 DREAMER'S JOURNEY, supra note 26, at 177.
48 Id. at 179.
49 See Cairns, supra note 1, at 258-60. See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980).
"o Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494.
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throughout our history""-was no longer constitutionally valid?
Comments by the Supreme Court itself are insightful: "It is not un-
common for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are
involved . . . . The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by
the nature of the problem."" Perhaps one of the most interesting recent
examples of the current perception of this issue occurred in 1972 when
Justice Rehnquist was asked to recuse himself on the basis of Congres-
sional testimony on a certain subject during his employment with the De-
partment of Justice. Refusing to disqualify himself, he explained: "Proof
that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence
of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." 5 Off-the-bench comments, pur-
portedly made by other Supreme Court Justices, are also of interest: "I'd
rather create a precedent than find one;" 6 and, "We are the Supreme
Court and can do what we want."67
Although Cohen recognized and asserted that judges made law, he
was not happy with the pre-Roosevelt Supreme Court. Aware of the inev-
itability of judicial legislation, Cohen sought to force the courts to ex-
amine their assumptions openly." He consistently objected to judicial re-
view by the Supreme Court" and this penetrating question: "How many
times have the people of the United States actually been saved by the
judiciary from injustice at the hands of the legislature and executive?
And how often have judicial interventions themselves produced injus-
tice?" 0 Cohen frequently responded to his own inquiries by reciting a
litany of Supreme Court decisions which were, in his judgment, deleteri-
ous to the public interest." It is fascinating to speculate how he would
have reacted to the Warren Court's vigorous protection of individual
rights vis-h-vis the Congress and the President and their State counter-
parts, as compared with the pattern of the Supreme Court in his day.
Cohen believed that law necessarily included general ethical precepts.
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
"' Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J., denying motion to
recuse).
" See Wermeil, The Philosophical Legacy of William 0. Douglas, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1980,
at 16, col. 3 (quoting William 0. Douglas).
'B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 61 (1979)
(quoting Warren E. Burger); see also Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1269 (1979).
'6 Laski, supra note 1, at 583.
00 See, e.g., Overruling the Supreme Court: A Plea for Abolishing the Judicial Veto, NEW
LEADER, May 30, 1936, at 5.
00 Cohen, On Absolutisms in Law and Morals, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 681 (1936).
" See Konvitz, Morris Raphael Cohen, 7 THE ANTIOCH REv. 487, 494 (1947).
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Society must recognize that in rendering judicial decisions, judges articu-
late their own ethical prejudices and sociological precepts under the guise
of "the law." It was a curious, but necessary, corollary from his view in
this regard that the law had a dynamic character which should be pro-
tected: "[N]o one can really understand law apart from law in the mak-
ing." 2 Further, "the sense of justice must necessarily exercise an influ-
ence in any growing law ....
For years, Cohen was nearly the sole intellectual force in the struggle
to dethrone the phonograph theory of law.64 Judge Margold assessed the
results: "Morris R. Cohen made the phonograph theory of justice intellec-
tually untenable . . . . In this change the voice of Morris R. Cohen was
the voice of the prophet who first points out that which becomes obvious
to all once it has been declared." ' 6
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL THEMES
Thus far, Cohen's influence on the law has been considered in broad,
general terms. His principal focus in these areas was not so much with the
law in a given field, but rather with rigorous analysis of underlying as-
sumptions and factual underpinnings. His approach was-as it was al-
ways in the classroom-to subject all seemingly plausible and "obvious"
justifications to a rigorous intellectual critique in the light of all possible
alternatives. "[O]ne of the primary rules of the intellectual game is that
ideas must submit to the most rigorous criticism and to the test of fact.""
Next we consider his philosophy on three areas of substantive law.
A. Property
Cohen thoroughly examined "the nature of property, its justification,
and the ultimate meaning of the policies based on it."'67 He viewed private
property as a manifestation of sovereignty, as a form of power, rather
than merely as material goods. Inherent in property was "the right to
exclude others."' "6 He saw property "as sovereign power compelling ser-
vice-and obedience . . . . [D]ominion over things is also imperium over
our fellow human beings.""9 In Cohen's view, the role of the law of prop-
" REASON AND NATURE, supra note 20, at 375 n.21.
" Id. at 406.
" See Konvitz, supra note 61, at 494 n.70.
65 Margold, Morris R. Cohen as a Teacher of Lawyers and Jurists, in FREEDOM AND REASON
40 (1951).
6REASON AND NATURE, supra note 20, at 400.
67 Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11 (1927), reprinted in LAW AND
SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 45.
" Cohen, supra note 67, at 12.
6 Id. at 12-13.
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erty is not limited to the protection of possessions. Rather, it determines
who will receive the future social product.
Thus ... the owners of all revenue-producing property are in fact granted
by the law certain powers to tax the future social product. When to this
power of taxation there is added the power to command the services of large
numbers of people who are not economically independent, we have the es-
sence of what historically has constituted political sovereignty.70
This concept of property has a direct and pragmatic social meaning
for Cohen; it is not merely a gambit in a philosophic chess game: "[I]t is
necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social
ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the
discussion of any just form of government."7 1 The application of this con-
cept of property to the real world has important political and social im-
plications, since property owners must subordinate their interests to
those of society as a whole.72 "[I]t would be as absurd to argue that the
distribution of property must never be modified by law as it would be to
argue that the distribution of political power must never be changed. 7 8
Private property, according to Cohen, was not sacrosanct from govern-
ment interference or retrenchment. The issue was not abolition of private
property, "but the determination of the precise lines along which private
enterprise must be given free scope and where it must be restricted in the
interests of the common good."'7 4 For Cohen, there are no absolute or ina-
lienable property rights.
Because plural sovereignty exists (divided between the sovereignty
exercised by groups of property owners and the sovereignty exercised by
the state), the final "deciding word is given to the State as the organ of
the general community. 7 5 Since "the large property owner is . . . a
wielder of power over the lives of his fellow citizens, the law should not
hesitate to develop a doctrine as to his positive duties in the public inter-
est. " Cohen, therefore, supported the legality of minimum wage laws,
protection of labor union memberships, the confiscation of slaves from
their owners, and other restrictions on property. Furthermore, Cohen per-
ceived the question of whether the tasks which society must perform
should be left to private enterprise or to the government as properly a
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 14.
71 Id. at 19.
1' Id. at 16.
7 Id. at 21.
71 REAsON AND NATURE, supra note 1, at 297; Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social
Philosophy, 16 J. PHILOSOPHY 673 (1918).
76 Cohen, supra note 67, at 26.
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question of which is most efficient."7 Thus, the governmental orbit encom-
passed such things as the construction of bridges and roads, universal ed-
ucation, control of city congestion, restrictions on advertising, and the
protection of the public against products deleterious to the public health.
For Cohen, "there must be restrictions on the use of property not only in
the interests of other property owners but also in the interests of health,
safety, religion, morals, and the general welfare of the whole
community.
7 8
B. Contracts
Cohen rejected all theories of contract as involving nothing but pri-
vate relations between the contracting parties. Instead, he viewed the law
of contracts as a branch of public law which involved aspects of
sovereignty:
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts the
sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party to be exercised over
the other party. It thus grants a limited sovereignty to the former ....
From this point of view the law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary
branch of public law, as a body of rules according to which the sovereign
power of the state shall be exercised as between the parties to a more or less
private transaction.79
This concept of contract had special meaning when first published in
1933, during the Depression, when novel ideas developed as to the power
of the state to control its participation in the enforcement of contracts.
Cohen argued that the freedom to contract necessarily had to be subject
to restrictions, since the state's power to compel enforcement could be
invoked by a contracting party. 0 He noted developments whereby "the
terms of the agreement are more and more being fixed by law,"'" pointing
to the child labor laws and contracts of insurance, among others. Cohen
even analogized contract law "as having a function somewhat parallel to
that of the criminal law," referring to limitations on the enforcement of
gambling contracts and agreements in restraint of trade.8 2 He opposed
the current ideology of unrestrained individualism and uninhibited free-
dom of contract which necessarily ignores society's objectives.
The core of Cohen's contractual theory as a form of public law is that
7 Id. at 27.
78 Id. at 21-22.
79 Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARD. L. REv. 586 (1933), reprinted in LAW AND SOCIAL
ORDER, supra note 1, at 101.
8o Cohen, supra note 79, at 587.
81 LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 70.
82 Cohen, supra note 79, at 589.
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"at no time does a community completely abdicate its right to limit and
regulate the effect of private agreements, a right that it must exercise to
safeguard what it regards as the interest of all its members."8 "[T]he
notion that in enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will
of the parties rests upon an utterly untenable theory as to what the en-
forcement of contracts involves."'"
C. Criminal Law
Cohen viewed the various theories of crime, criminality, and punish-
ment in terms of ethics." An analysis of criminal law raises ethical con-
siderations-such as equality and conflicting interest-which are present
in any legal analysis. As in other areas of the law, criminal rules must be
susceptible to change so that criminal law will reflect the prevailing mores
of the community.
The law of property and contract and, criminal law were thought by
Cohen to be elements in one large category of public law. In each area,
specifications have been designated which determine when public force
will actively punish those who violate society's proscriptions. In his
thoughts on property, contract, and criminal law, Cohen applied his basic
approach in philosophical thought to law: factual investigation, uncover-
ing basic assumptions, critical analysis of alternatives in terms of their
social, political and public consequences, and the application of his own
philosophic insight. Several factors stand out clearly. First, Cohen was
interested in concrete subjects in the law. Second, he was interested in
the practical effects of the law in politics, economics, and society. For
example, if both property and contract are forms of public law, the cus-
tomary distinction between public and private law is contradicted. His
formulation points the way to effective public control of both property
and contract. Likewise, in recognizing the role of ethical and moral con-
siderations in criminal law, he emphasizes the need for that law's har-
mony with changing public concepts and views as to what should and
should not be punished. As stated in "My Philosophy of Law":
The law is not a homeless wandering ghost. It is a phase of human life lo-
cated in time and space .... No discussion of the philosophy of law can
properly omit reference to the ultimate aims of law and the extent to which
it can influence human fate. .. ."
For Cohen, law was not a closed system impervious to injustice.
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CONCLUSION
What was Morris R. Cohen's influence on American law? As far back
as 1927, Felix Frankfurter said: "There isn't a thinking lawyer in this
country, there isn't a judge who reflects on his task, who hasn't been...
directly or indirectly impregnated with the contributions of Morris R. Co-
hen to jurisprudence. '87
Even before Cohen's books on legal philosophy were published, Ben-
jamin Cardo7, recognized that Cohen's "power will be felt in every law
school in the land." 8 Milton R. Konvitz wrote: "Cohen's influence on
judges and teachers of law can hardly be exaggerated. The weight of his
legal philosophy was felt in high courts, including the United States Su-
preme Court."8 9 In 1960, John Schmidhauser wrote: "The liberal legal
tradition. . . derives much of its contemporary vitality from the pragma-
tism of James and Dewey and the contributions of jurists such as Holmes
and Cardozo and of philosophers such as Morris Raphael Cohen."90 In
1971, Herbert G. Reid said that "the influence of Morris Cohen continues
to be felt in twentieth century American law."' And in 1977, Edward B.
Myers described "how constructive interpretation of Cohen's legal science
constitutes a framework within which a usable liberal jurisprudence can
be developed.'
Cohen's influence on American law continues. His concept of the phi-
losophy of law and his view of law as a social science"' have become part
of the core of modern legal teaching and judicial decisionmaking. Since
the philosophy of law is now recognized by lawyers and philosophers as a
necessary component of the law, since it is accepted that judges make and
do not merely declare law, since it is now a general principle that the law
is a social science that must recognize the social, political, and economic
needs and moral aspirations of the people, the prior situation has become
somewhat difficult to recall.
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PHILOSOPHER'S INFLUENCE
Perhaps Cohen's biographer best perceived his special significance
in American life. She wrote that his most comprehensive contribution
was in serving as "intellectual animator of America." Not the least of
his animating influences was to bring about a continuing acceptance by
American lawyers and philosophers of their indispensable mutual
interdependency.
L. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 431.
